Philosophy at Cambridge, Newsletter of the Faculty of Philosophy by Pellegrino, Mariella
Philosophy at Cambridge page 1 May 2007
Philosophy at Cambridge
Newsletter of the Faculty of Philosophy
Issue 4
May 2007 
From the Chair
A few facts to welcome you to 
the fourth issue of the Faculty’s
Newsletter.
In 1953 there were 13 candidates
for Part II of the Moral Sciences
Tripos (among them Pat Crossman, 
as she tells us on p.6). In 1957 there
were 19 (among them Michael Frayn,
who writes opposite about how the
subject gripped him). By 1968 (when
the present author sat Part II) there
were 24, and in 2006 the number was
56. And in the 1950s the Faculty had
a mere handful of graduate students.
Today we have 40.
The number of those teaching in
the Faculty has risen over the same
period from 5 in 1953 (Broad,
Wisdom, Braithwaite, Ewing and
Lewy) to today’s 12. In 1953 the
library was housed in one room in the
north-west corner of the Old Schools,
the Faculty had no office base of its
own and lectures took place in 
Mill Lane or the Music School. The
move to the Sidgwick site in 1961
initiated changes in the Faculty’s
accommodation, the latest stage in
which is recorded on p.8.
It would be good to put some life
on these dry bones. What shifts of
content and style have there been in
lectures over the decades? How do
supervisions compare? Are meetings
of the Moral Sciences Club now the
same in atmosphere as they were
half a century ago? The memories of
our alumni cover from the Second
World War to the present. So
perhaps we will be able to bring you
answers to these questions, and
other similarly intriguing ones, in
future issues.
Jane Heal FBA
Professor of Philosophy
Chair of the Faculty Board
The Human Touch
Michael Frayn
Most of the books I’ve written have
been fiction. The Human Touch,
though, is something else. It’s an
exploration of what seems to me to
be the central oddity of the universe
we live in, and of our relations with
it. The oddity is an obvious one —
so obvious that you might go
through a whole lifetime without
even registering it, just as you might
without ever consciously taking in
the staggering complexity of what
you see when you look at the back
of your own hand.
It’s this simple paradox. The
universe is very large and very old.
Humankind, by comparison, is only
a tiny disturbance in one small
corner of it — and a very recent one.
Yet the universe is only very large
and very old because we are here to
say that it is. Without us to see it
from our one tiny viewpoint, and to
talk about it and attempt to measure
it and formulate the principles on
which it works, it isn’t large and it
isn’t old. It doesn’t have a size. There
are no principles on which it works.
It isn’t anything.
And yet, of course, we all know
perfectly well that it is what it is
whether we are here or not. It was
here long before we were, and it will
go on being here long after we have
all departed.
This paradox (it seems to me) is at
the root of all philosophy. It’s at the
heart of all the problems that have
been puzzling philosophers for at
least two thousand years now —
about the nature of perception and
ethics, of language and mathematics,
and of man himself. It’s the central
puzzle of life.
So is this book philosophy? Well, 
I read philosophy at Cambridge, and
it was one of the most formative
experiences of my life. A lot of the
book takes its rise from what 
I first learned and discussed there,
and I remain immensely indebted 
to the people who taught me
(especially to Jonathan Bennett, my
supervisor in my last year). Some
slight acquaintance with the subject,
though, makes me wary of claiming
to be practising it (particularly in a
publication issued by my old Faculty
itself). I know enough to understand
that professional philosophy these
days is a very specialised and often
highly technical subject, and to
understand how little I know 
about it.
It seems to me, though, that there 
is still sometimes — sometimes — 
a place for philosophy in a more old-
fashioned and non-specialised sense 
of the word, as a quite general
speculation about the nature of the
universe, and about the nature of
human beings and their place in it.
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There is still sometimes an
opportunity for some idiot who
doesn’t know too much about
anything in particular to put his head
above the parapet for a moment, and
risk getting it shot off while he takes a
look around at the battlefield.
Stupidity and ignorance aren’t
qualities to boast about, but they do
occasionally have their point. Not
knowing what everyone else knows
might just offer the chance to look at
things as if they’d never been looked
at before, and to be astonished at the
sheer strangeness of them. If you don’t
know what’s already been said about
the world, and you have to try to look
name on developing countries.
Pogge has put forward a host of
‘feasible and politically realistic’
proposals to reform these institutions
and frameworks, so that we no
longer cause harm to people in these
countries; see e.g. his book World
Poverty and Human Rights (Polity,
2002). 
In the lecture Pogge demonstrated
once more his imagination and
ingenuity in tackling the difficult
question of how to implement our
moral obligations within the
framework of real life politics. His
topic was specifically the international
intellectual property rights system 
as it applies to pharmaceutical
companies. He proposed to
supplement the current patent
On a rainy afternoon in November,
Thomas Pogge (Columbia and ANU)
inaugurated the new annual lecture
series sponsored by Routledge.
Professor Pogge is known for his
fine work on Kant and Rawls, but
perhaps more famous for his tireless
efforts to make us realise the extent
of the deprivation faced by the poor
in developing countries and the
gravity of our moral responsibility
for their plight. According to Pogge,
we are obliged to eradicate this
poverty not so much because of our
positive duty to assist, but because
of our negative duty not to harm.
He argues that the root causes of
global poverty are the international
institutions and legal frameworks
that our governments impose in our
The First Routledge Lecture
at it itself, you discover what a
bizarrely confused place it is. And if
you manage to stand back far enough
to get a glimpse of your own
interactions with it — and with all the
other people around you who are also
trying to relate to it — you might see
how elusive they are. You might even
come to understand something about
the elusiveness of your own self.
I suppose that questions like this
have formed the background to most
of the fiction I’ve written over the last
forty or fifty years. On and off,
though, for all that time, I’ve also
been struggling to confront them
directly. Every time I thought I could
glimpse some small corner of the
battlefield through the smoke, I’ve
written down what I thought I could
see. And in the last few years I began
to think that perhaps the time had
come, before I got any older and
found it even harder to think straight,
to set out all this material in some
sort of ordered form. This book, for
better or for worse, is the result.
Michael Frayn (Emmanuel) is an
author, playwright and honorary
member of the Faculty. The Human
Touch is published by Faber and
Faber, 2006. ISBN 0571232175.
Jane Heal and Thomas Pogge
system with an alternative one,
which would align the incentives of
the pharmaceutical industry more
closely with the interests of the
global poor. Under this alternative
system, pharmaceutical companies
would receive extra benefits for 
the first twenty years of the product
life of their new drugs, but not by
giving them monopoly power over
these drugs, as is the case with 
the current patent system. Rather,
they would be paid economic rent in
proportion to the reduction in 
the global disease burden achieved
by their new drugs. Pogge argued
that this new system would (a)
incentivize the development of drugs
for neglected diseases, such as
malaria, that account for one third
of global deaths, (b) encourage
generic drug manufacturers to drive
down prices so that new drugs
become affordable to the poor, and
(c) smoothen the delivery of drugs to
the poor by using well-oiled
corporate machines. 
In the lively discussion following
his lecture, Professor Pogge fleshed
out his proposal — how it will be
financed and implemented. He
admitted that there are still some issues
that need to be addressed, especially
with respect to measurement and
administration. The lecture and
subsequent discussion proved to be a
stimulating and timely reminder of
our obligations to distant others in
need.
Fabian Freyenhagen
Temporary Lecturer in Philosophy
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Exaggerated
Reports
of My Death
Philosophy is supposed to reconcile us to death, and even
to reported death. It is nice to confirm that it can indeed
do so. This message was sent in January to the Trinity
Record by Moral Scientist Jonathan Agnew (1960).
Subject: Exaggerated reports of my death
To the Editor of the Trinity Record
Dear Sir,
I have been informed that the latest issue of the Trinity
Record reports that I died last August. I am unable to
verify this information directly since, with a certain
internal consistency, you are no longer sending me a copy
of the Record. I am pleased to tell you (and I hope that
you will be pleased to learn) that I am alive and well and
assure you that, within the limits of my powers, I will
inform you if the situation changes. I should be most
grateful if you would publish a correction before reality
catches up with your report and send me a copy of the
latest issue of the Record so that I can read and, if
necessary, correct my obituary. Without parapsychological
means, I remain a devoted reader of your Record and give
you my permission to publish this email.
Yours faithfully, Jonathan Agnew
Faculty News
This year the Faculty welcomed Quassim Cassam,
appointed as Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy,
and Clare Chambers as University Lecturer. In October
2007 Ciara Fairley will join the Faculty as a post-
doctoral Research Fellow.
Ross Harrison and Jeremy Butterfield re-joined the
Cambridge Philosophy community, taking on posts in
‘high places’. Ross Harrison is now Provost of King’s
College and Jeremy Butterfield is a Senior Research
Fellow at Trinity College.
This year Dominic Scott leaves the Faculty to
become Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Virginia at Charlottesville, and in the summer Fabian
Freyenhagen will join the Department of Philosophy,
University of Essex, as a Lecturer in Moral and
Political Philosophy. Vela Mitova is now an Andrew
Mellon post-doctoral fellow in the Philosophy
Department at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, and
in September 2006 Johannes Smit started as a Lecturer
in Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
The Faculty wishes them all the very best for the future.
Lubomira Radoilska has been awarded a Wellcome
Trust Research Fellowship in Biomedical Ethics for 
a project on ‘Needs, Rights and Preferences in
Pharmaceutical Ethics’.
Several of our philosophers have been invited to give
lectures around the world. Hugh Mellor was a Keynote
Speaker at the ‘Truth and Reality’ conference at the
University of Otago, New Zealand. Michael Potter
gave the William Reinhardt Lecture in the Philosophy
of Mathematics at the University of Colorado at
Boulder. Simon Blackburn was the 2007 Ryle Lecturer
at Trent University, Ontario in Canada. Alex Oliver
spoke at the UK-España conference on Innovation,
held in Valencia.
On 18 November 2006, a one-day conference was held in
King’s College on Metaethics, organised by Fabian
Freyenhagen. Six talks were given by philosophers at the
forefront of this vast and vibrant area. The day started
with a debate on moral realism between Russ Shafer-Landau
(Wisconsin) and Michael Ridge (Edinburgh). After lunch,
practical reason was discussed by John Broome and
Alison Hills (both Oxford). Onora O’Neill (Cambridge)
and Thomas Pink (King’s London) concluded the day by
examining the phenomenon of normativity. The sessions
were chaired by three members of the Faculty who 
also work in metaethics: Simon Blackburn, Hallvard
Lillehammer and Fabian Freyenhagen himself. The
conference was deemed to be a great success, attracting
some 80 participants from across the globe.
Ben Colburn, PhD student in the Faculty of Philosophy
Metaethics
Conference
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Quassim Cassam joined the Faculty
in January 2007 as the Knightbridge
Professor of Philosophy. Before
coming to Cambridge, he was
Professor in the Department of
Philosophy at University College
London. From 1986 to 2004 he was
a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at
Wadham College, Oxford. He has
also held visiting positions at
University of California, Berkeley
and at Northwestern University,
where he was the John Evans
Distinguished Visiting Professor in
Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in
2004. He was born in Mombasa,
Kenya, and came to live in the
United Kingdom in his mid-teens.
Like his immediate predecessor in
the Knightbridge Chair, Edward
Craig, Quassim Cassam includes
epistemology as one of his major
research interests. 
The study of epistemology is as old as
philosophy itself. Have the basic tools
of the epistemologist changed?
Cassam: The tools are fundamentally
the same, thinking hard being 
the main one, but it’s now a
tremendously interesting and fast-
moving area of philosophy. When I
was a graduate student, philosophy
of mind was seen as the sexiest
branch of philosophy. Nowadays
epistemology seems to have taken
over from philosophy of mind as
the area in which the most
interesting work is being done.
Your new book is entitled ‘The
Possibility of Knowledge’ (Oxford,
2007). According to the OUP
website, this book offers a distinctive
approach to basic questions in
epistemology. How would you
characterize that approach?
Cassam: Well, that’s a bit of
publishers’ hyperbole. The basic
idea is very simple: a key question
in epistemology is ‘how is such and
such knowledge (e.g. of the
external world, or of other minds)
possible?’ These are obstacle-
dependent questions: we ask how a
certain kind of knowledge is
possible when we think that there
are obstacles to its existence or
acquisition. What we want to
know, in other words, is how a
certain kind of knowledge is
possible given the various factors
that make it look impossible.
Writers in the Kantian tradition
sometimes give the impression that
the way to answer a how-possible
question is to come up with a
transcendental argument. That’s a
mistake, and not one that Kant
himself made. Explaining how
something is possible is not a
matter of identifying necessary
conditions for its possibility.
Rather, what we need to do is to
identify means by which something
is possible. Means aren’t necessary
conditions, nor are they enough.
Obstacles to the acquisition of
knowledge by the proposed means
also need to be overcome or
An Interview with Quassim Cassam
Hallvard Lillehammer and Quassim Cassam
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dissipated. Finally, we might
consider what makes it possible to
acquire knowledge by the proposed
means. So we now have the idea of
a multi-levels response to a how-
possible question, one that operates
at three interconnected levels: the
level of means, of obstacle-removal,
and of enabling conditions. In my
book, I spell out the idea of a
multi-levels response to a how-
possible question and use it to
tackle three specific how-possible
questions, about the external
world, other minds and a priori
knowledge. There is also a chapter
on why the multi-levels response
isn’t a transcendental response and
on why transcendental arguments
are no good when it comes to
finding an answer to a how-
possible question.
The nature of transcendental
arguments has been one of the
recurring themes of your research ever
since your DPhil work at Oxford.
What first made you interested in
this topic?
Cassam: I first became interested
when, as a second year undergraduate
at Oxford, I read chapter 3 of Peter
Strawson’s Individuals. I was
fascinated not so much by the
details of the argument but by the
way of arguing. So when I did 
the BPhil and then the DPhil at
Oxford I ended up writing theses on
transcendental arguments. My
supervisors were Strawson and
David Wiggins. As it happens,
Simon Blackburn was one of my
examiners for the DPhil.
Your first book, ‘Self and World’
(Oxford 1997), is about the nature of
self-consciousness and self-reference.
How would you summarize its main
conclusions? 
Cassam: It’s an exploration of what
is necessary for self-consciousness.
When I was working on this topic,
lots of writers in the Strawsonian
tradition — Strawson himself,
Evans, McDowell — were arguing
that in order to be self-conscious
one must conceive of oneself as a
physical thing, as a corporeal object
among corporeal objects. I was
sceptical about this requirement
and was more interested in
pursuing experiential rather than
intellectual conditions for self-
consciousness.
My idea was that in order to be
self-conscious one must experience
oneself as a physical object among
physical objects. Following Kant,
my label for this kind of awareness
was ‘intuitive awareness’ of oneself
as a physical thing. This isn’t 
just awareness of one’s body as
physical but awareness of oneself
‘qua subject’ as shaped, located 
and solid.
The suggestion that bodily self-
awareness is important for self-
consciousness is one that lots of
writers in the continental tradition
have developed. Even Descartes
recognizes the importance of bodily
self-awareness, though not its
indispensability, in the passage in
the Meditations where he says that
he isn’t in his body like a pilot in a
ship. His point is that the
connection is much more intimate
than that, and I think that he was
right about this.
Are there any issues on which you
have come to change your mind over
the ten years since you published that
book?
Cassam: I’m much more sceptical
now about the neo-Kantian project
of establishing necessary conditions
for self-consciousness or experience
or whatever. Interesting claims of
this type are extremely hard to
establish. The important thing 
is to explore all the different ways
in which self-consciousness is, for
us, bound up with various forms of
bodily self-awareness. It’s a further
question whether this is a matter 
of bodily self-awareness being a
strictly necessary condition for
consciousness of self.
What projects do you see yourself
working on over the coming years? 
Cassam: A couple of years ago I
was invited to contribute a 
paper to a volume called
Williamson on Knowledge. That
paper — ‘Can the Concept of
Knowledge be Analysed?’ —
sparked lots of new lines of
thinking, ones that don’t really
figure in The Possibility of
Knowledge. So it’s possible that my
third book will also end up being
about knowledge. The provisional
title is Ways of Knowing.
The institutional environment of
academic philosophy has been subject
to major change since you joined the
profession in the 1980s. What do you
see as the main challenges facing an
incoming Knightbridge Professor in
2007?
Cassam: The main challenge is to 
help to maintain Cambridge’s
position as one of the best places to
study Philosophy in the world. I’m
delighted to be here and look forward
to working with an excellent group of
colleagues and some outstanding
students.
This interview was conducted by
Hallvard Lillehammer
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy
The Possibility of
Knowledge
QUASSIM CASSAM
• A new approach to epistemology
• Cassam is one of Britain's leading
philosophers
Hbk | 248 pages | March 2007 | 978-0-19-920831-9 | £27.50
1
For more information contact:  
Jenny Breaker, Academic Marketing 
Email: jenny.breaker@oup.com 
24-hour credit card hotline: Tel: +44 (0)1536 454534
Philosophy from Oxford
Self and World
QUASSIM CASSAM
• A landmark treatment of one of the
deepest problems of philosophy
• Brings together ‘analytical' and
‘Continental' approaches to
philosophy
Pbk | 216 pages | 1999 | 978-0-19-823895-9 | £22.00
Thought and Reality
MICHAEL DUMMETT
• Summation of the work of a giant of
contemporary philosophy
• Highly original views on central issues
in metaphysics, epistemology, and
philosophy of language
Hbk | 124 pages | 2006 | 978-0-19-920727-5 | £16.99
Plato
Political Philosophy
MALCOLM SCHOFIELD
• Engages with all the key themes of Plato's
political thought as live issues for today
• Sets out and analyses Plato's arguments
clearly and succinctly
Pbk | 394 pages | 2006 | 978-0-19-924946-6 | £18.99
Visit www.oup.com
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The war came when I was 8 years old
and “grown up”. Working class girls
of that age had often been sent into
service. The war came and went. Now
there was peace and the miracle of the
Welfare State arrived, and a glass
ceiling was shattered. Working class
kids were awarded scholarships to
study at Oxford and Cambridge.
I was one of the lucky ones. In
1950 I went up to Cambridge to
study English. My college was Girton,
two miles away from the town, with
strict rules about “men visitors”.
Cambridge was still a segregated
world, and the wounds of class were
still hidden. I joined the Amateur
Dramatic Club.
But by 1952 my world had become
two-dimensional. The magic had
gone. I poured out my unhappiness to
my friend Thom Gunn who took me
to see his favorite teacher in action,
the iconoclastic Frankie Leavis of
Downing. “Ladies and gentle men!”,
he intoned, “Poetry must have real
Meaning! Bad poetry is meaningless,
look at Tennyson! Now John Donne
on the other hand is a poet.” And
then he recited A Valediction:
Forbidding Mourning, Donne’s
exquisite metaphysical love song for
his wife. 
Language was alive again, the
missing dimension returned. My
tutors suggested that I read Moral
Science Part II in my last year. That
summer term was hazily hot. I laid in
the grass and read Bishop Berkeley’s
Dialogues pondering on “the meaning
of it all”. I was introduced to a new
language: Propositions and Premises
A Girton Girl in Search
of Meaning
Pat Crossman
(prepositions or promises?), 
Inductive and Deductive Logic, Free
Will versus Determinism, Probability,
Uncertainty, and the Big Puzzle of
Time. There were twelve young men
in the school. I was the only girl. My
teachers were impressive. Dr Broad
was portly and spoke slowly, the
salient points being repeated three
times. And Dr Wisdom had a gremlin
in his watch! I flirted with Logical
Positivism, but found only the ghost
of Wittgenstein.
But my guide through all this
strangeness was my tutor Dr Alfred
Ewing. Crouching by the gas fire in his
small cluttered front room we would
construct and then deconstruct the
theories of the great epistemologists.
He liked Leibniz and Berkeley.
Philosophical enquiry was his passion,
then ping-pong. He was a reserved,
but kindly man, only stern about
homework. Sometimes after my
supervision he would say, “You may
remove your gown Miss Amy [my
maiden name]. Would you like to play
ping-pong?” He was a skilful and
cunning player. This was Applied
Philosophy: the ping-pong ball was a
monad, but a monad in action!
I attended all his Saturday morning
lectures, only missing one in my last
term when I was being auctioned in
the market square together with other
sporting Girton girls for some worthy
cause. Returning from his lecture he
had seen me, “So you missed my
lecture?” I tearfully apologized,
explaining “But it was fun!” “More
fun than my lecture?” But as he
thoughtfully told me later “Maybe 
I should have had more fun.”
Before I left I played the role of
Gina in Ibsen’s Wild Duck and
transformed that grim tragedy into a
farce, to entertain a cheerful but
inebriated audience. It was all about
timing. And now it was time to go
down and start working. I was sent to
The London School of Economics, to
become a social scientist. I became
Generic Social Worker, to begin
clearing up the rubble of the war,
because this would be a new world.
And the “meaning of it all” would be
the story I would tell myself.
Pat Crossman (Girton) is a social
worker living in Berkeley, California
An Old 
Cantabrigian
Philosophical
Ditty
(anon., trad.)
When losing a tussle
With Russell,
Or, heavens, bored
With Broad,
Just try chewing
A.C. Ewing.
When shook to the core
By Moore,
Try to abridge 
Old Sidge
(A diligent few’ll
Go further, to Whewell).
When a history yen
Stalls on Whichcote (Ben),
Try making
The trip back to Bacon
Who dispersed the miasmas
Surrounding Erasmus.
When early Witters
Brings on jitters
Then reader, thank
Ramsey (Frank)
For quashing that working, then
Suggesting Bemerkungen.
From the Editor
We want to hear from you!
The Editor welcomes all comments
and suggestions or material for future
editions of the Newsletter.
Please contact:
Mrs Mariella Pellegrino
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DA
U.K.
Phone: +44 1223 331889
Fax: +44 1223 335091
email: mp10004@cam.ac.uk
A downloadable version of the
Newsletter is available from the
Faculty website:
www.phil.cam.ac.uk
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Future
Events
ALUMNI WEEKEND
2007
Saturday 22 September
‘Wittgenstein in Conflict:
how the Tractatus was born’
A Lecture
Speaker:
Dr Michael Potter 
Reader in the Philosophy of
Mathematics.
11:15am
Location tba
‘Philosophy at Cambridge
through the years’
An Exhibition
Faculty of Philosophy
Sidgwick Site
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge CB3 9DA
For more information please contact
Mrs Mariella Pellegrino
Faculty of Philosophy
email: mp10004@cam.ac.uk
A buffet lunch will be 
served in the Faculty, 
from 12:30pm to 1:30pm.
Please see the Alumni Weekend 2007
booklet for details about 
booking and cost.
ROUTLEDGE LECTURE
2007– 8
Professor Andy Clark of the
University of Edinburgh 
will deliver the second 
Routledge Lecture on 
31 January 2008. 
Further details will be available on
the Faculty website:
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/
Since arriving in
Cambridge at the end of
September 2006, I have 
been finishing a book, Sex,
Culture and Justice: 
The Limits of Choice
(Penn State University Press,
forthcoming). It criticises 
the liberal focus on choice
in the context of unequal or
harmful practices, particularly
those of sexual inequality. 
I discuss the examples
mentioned above, which
share the feature that they
are mandated and
encouraged by culture — be
it wider Western liberal
culture or the culture of
minority groups. 
Liberals in general know
what to think about acts of
gendered harm sanctioned
by ‘other’ cultures. Practices
such as female genital
mutilation and foot binding
are unacceptable, even if they are
consented to by the women in question
(in Britain, genital mutilation is illegal
even for adult women). But what
about consensual practices such as
cosmetic surgery situated in our own
culture? Feminist philosophers value
choice — indeed, one of the greatest
triumphs of the feminist movement 
has been to ensure greater choice for
women over their own lives. But
choice is only part of the story. We
need to understand the origins of the
choices people make, the context in
which they are being made, the
pressures and constraints upon them.
The fact that culture inevitably shapes
both the identities and the preferences
of individuals is problematic for an
emphasis on choice. If cultures shape
choices, it is not straightforward to use
those choices as the measure of the
justice of the culture.
Instead of relying on choice as the
determinant of justice, we need to
critically examine processes by which
individuals are encouraged to choose
to do things that harm them, or that
undermine their equality. It is right to
legally proscribe some such practices.
For choice, though important to
justice, does not guarantee it.
Clare Chambers
University Lecturer in Philosophy
Should people be allowed to engage in
practices which harm them? First
thoughts suggest that they should. 
If liberal rights protect anything, we
might say, they protect our ability to
do what we want with our bodies. 
If we want to bungee jump from a
crane, ski down a dangerous
mountain slope, or go potholing in
dangerous waters, then the rights
enshrined by liberal democratic
regimes tell us that we can, as long as
we are willing to bear the
consequences.
But self-inflicted harms are not
always as obvious or exceptional as
these. Sometimes they are made so
acceptable by prevailing social 
norms that they do not even appear to
be ‘harms’ at all. Individuals often
choose to do things that harm 
them or undermine their equality. In
particular, women often choose to
participate in practices of sexual
inequality: cosmetic surgery, gendered
patterns of work and childcare,
makeup, restrictive clothing, unequal
laws and norms concerning marriage
and divorce or religious leadership. 
In response to such practices, liberal
political philosophers tend to rely on
choice as the determinant of justice. 
If a practice is freely chosen, or if an
individual is free to leave a group with
unequal norms, most liberals are
content to accept the situation as just.
Choice and Culture
Clare Chambers
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More Space for the
Faculty
The 2000 refurbishment of the Raised Faculty Building
saw the Faculty gaining its first dedicated space for
graduate students, a common room, several offices for
academic staff and an independent Faculty Library. 
The Library was named after Casimir Lewy (1919–1991)
who had been an inspirational member of the Faculty. 
More space became available in the building following
the move of the English Library. The Philosophy Faculty
successfully bid for enlargement and in September 2006
the Casimir Lewy Library re-opened in a much larger, 
self-contained area. The timetable for the building work
was very tight but efficient management by the main
contractor, ISG Dean & Bowes, ensured completion on
time. 
The new Library has a very welcoming, bright lobby
area and provides a much needed quiet study space
networked with the latest WiFi technology. The success 
of the new design has already resulted in an increased
number of users studying in the Library. With what is 
now called the ‘Old Library’ reconfigured as an open and
versatile space for general use as well as several additional
offices, the Faculty’s premises offer an ideal setting for its
dynamic community.
Richard Rorty’s Philosophical 
Papers
Volume 4, Philosophy as 
Cultural Politics
The fourth and final volume of Philosophical Papers by one of 
the world’s most provocative and creative thinkers.
Volume 4   £15.99 PB    |   Complete Set   £70.00 PB
‘(Rorty’s) books and articles read like a one-person international 
review of books: he collects fiction, history, and theory from around 
the world and marshalls it brilliantly according to the priorities of his 
anti-representationalist plot.’
The Times Higher Education Supplement
20% discount now available 
Visit www.cambridge.org/alumni to order today
www.cambridge.org/philosophy
Creative thinking from Cambridge
Originally published as a 
ten-volume print set, the 
Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy is regarded as an 
essential resource in the fields 
of philosophy and religion. 
REP Online grows each year 
with a diverse range of new 
material and regular revisions 
of major entries. There are 
nineteen newly commissioned articles for 2007 and recently updated 
articles include Kant, Feminism, Free Will and Epistemology.
With its easy, intuitive user environment and special resources for 
users at all levels, REP Online is a living and truly authoritative work 
that enriches the studies of academics, students and general readers 
worldwide.
‘...REP Online is sure to dazzle... this easy-to-use resource will 
definitely become the first stop for philosophy research. Highly 
recommended for academic and medium to large public libraries.’
- Library Journal
For free trials, pricing information and to subscribe please contact:
UK & Rest of World Customers:
Tel: +44(0) 20 7017 6062
Email: reference.online@tandf.co.uk
The Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy online
www.rep.routledge.com
outledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.indd   1 12/3/07   17:02:35
The Faculty gratefully acknowledges support for this newsletter from ISG D&B.
